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Abstract This paper analytically derives conditions under which the slope of the
tax-reaction function is negative in a classical tax competition model. If countries
maximize welfare, a negative slope (reflecting strategic substitutability) occurs under
relatively mild conditions. The strategic tax response is crucial for understanding tax
competition games, as well as the welfare effects of partial tax unions (whereby a
subset of countries coordinate their tax rates). Indeed, contrary to earlier findings that
have assumed strategic complementarity in tax rates, we show that partial tax unions
might reduce welfare under strategic substitutability.
Keywords Strategic substitutes · Asymmetry · Strategic tax response ·
Tax coordination
JEL Classification E62 · F21 · H25 · H77
1 Introduction
Most of the tax competition literature impose that tax rates are strategic complements,
i.e. if one country increases its tax rate, the best response of the other countries is to
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also increase their rate. This, however, is based on specific modeling assumptions. For
instance, a negatively sloped tax-reaction function (i.e. strategic substitutes) is ruled out
if governments maximize tax revenues rather than welfare (as in e.g. Kanbur and Keen
1993) or if a linear utility function is adopted in which public goods are at the margin
valued more than private goods (as in e.g. Devereux et al. 2008; Bucovetsky 2009).
The presumption that tax rates are strategic complements is not always supported by
empirical studies, however. In particular, several recent studies estimate tax-reaction
functions by regressing the tax of countries or local governments on some weighted
average of the tax in other jurisdictions. Thus, Devereux et al. (2008) andOveresch and
Rincke (2011) find that, on average, statutory corporate tax rates in OECD countries
are strategic complements.1 Yet, several studies report evidence for a negatively sloped
tax-reaction function, i.e. they report a negative coefficient for the tax rate in other
jurisdictions. Indeed, this is found for effective tax rates on capital income (Leibrecht
and Hochgatterer 2012), for tax competition between US States (Chirinko andWilson
2011) and for personal income taxes in local jurisdictions in Switzerland (Parchet
2013). Moreover, even if the average best response is positive, some countries may
still respond in an opposite manner.
This paper explores the possibilities for tax rates to be strategic substitutes. In
particular, it adopts a classical tax competitionmodel with a flexible objective function
for the government to derive conditions under which the slope of the tax-reaction
function can be negative. These conditions turn out to be rather mild and hold for
plausible parameter configurations. Hence, strategic substitutability should not be
ruled out, as previous studies have done.
The slope of the tax-reaction function can have important implications for the
analysis of tax competition and tax coordination, such as the welfare effects of a tax
union, whereby some countries opt in and others opt out of a tax agreement. In Konrad
and Schjelderup (1999), for example, the tax union is found to be unambiguously
welfare improving if tax rates are strategic complements. However, as we will show
below, the union countries may no longer benefit from such a tax union if tax rates are
strategic substitutes.
Only few papers in the literature allow tax rates to be strategic substitutes,
and even fewer study it in greater detail.2 Mintz and Tulkens (1986) explore
commodity tax competition between regions and—although their paper does not
focus on strategic tax responses—note that ‘strategic substitutes follows when
a sufficient degree of inelasticity of the demand for the public good prevails
[p. 154]’. Wilson (1991) makes a brief remark about the slope of the reaction
function in a footnote, saying that it depends on the utility function and ‘hard-
to-interpret’ properties like third derivatives of the production functions (Wilson
1991, p. 440, footnote 13). Laussel and Le Breton (1998) study the existence
1 Apart from tax-reaction functions for corporate taxes, the literature has also studied tax-reaction functions
for consumption taxes (Egger et al. 2005a, b; Jacobs et al. 2010) and public expenditures (Case et al. 1993).
See Brueckner (2003) for an overview of empirical studies.
2 The industrial organization literature has paid more attention to the slope of reaction functions; see e.g.
Bulow et al. (1985) for a classical reference on the discussion of strategic complements and substitutes,
applied to industrial organization.
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of Nash-equilibria in tax competition models and also mention that tax-reaction
curves can be non-linear (concave). Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) show that
strategic substitutes can occur when governments maximize a linear utility func-
tion, where the marginal value of private goods exceeds that of public goods
(in contrast to Devereux et al. 2008; Bucovetsky 2009, where public goods are
valued more at the margin). In Chirinko and Wilson (2011), tax rates can be
strategic substitutes under an addilog utility function in which public and pri-
vate goods are separable (see Houthakker 1960 for a discussion of this utility
function). The slope of the tax-reaction function in their model depends on the
income elasticity of demand for private relative to public goods. For a homo-
thetic utility function, they find that the slope of the reaction function is flat
(p. 11).
Our paper deviates from these earlier papers in three major ways. First, we ana-
lytically derive the conditions under which tax rates are strategic substitutes using a
more flexible CES utility function, comprising public and private goods. The results
are based on linearizations of the model, and hold only locally in the neighborhood
of the initial equilibrium. They are related to Chirinko and Wilson (2011), although
based on a more general utility function than theirs, which yields markedly differ-
ent interpretations. In particular, the slope of the tax-reaction function in our model
depends crucially on the substitution elasticity between public and private goods.
Intuitively, a higher foreign tax rate creates an inflow of capital to the own country,
which raises public income if the existing capital income tax is positive. For low
values of the substitution elasticity, the optimal response for the government is to
reduce the tax rate so as to increase private consumption. Thus, our intuition is closer
to that in Mintz and Tulkens (1986), although our model considers capital income
taxes, rather than consumption taxes. A second contribution of the paper is that it
illustrates the global properties of tax-reaction function by using simulations. For
various plausible parameter figurations, it shows that tax-reaction functions can be
negatively sloped. Finally, the paper shows the importance of the slope of the tax-
reaction function for the welfare analysis of tax coordination. In particular, countries
that form a tax union may suffer a welfare loss from coordinating their tax rates if
the best response of outsider countries is to do the opposite from the union coun-
tries. Hence, we find that tax unions are less likely if tax rates are strategic substi-
tutes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces themodel. Section
3 derives linearized tax-reaction function analytically and discusses conditions for tax
rates to be strategic substitutes around an initial equilibrium. Section 4 numerically
simulates tax-reaction function, showing their global properties for specific parameter
configurations. Section 5 illustrates the importance of strategic tax responses for the
welfare effects from the formation of tax unions. Section 6 concludes.
2 A model of tax competition
Consider n ≥ 2 countries, that are potentially asymmetric. We use i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
with i = j as country indices. Country i is populated by a fixed number of Ni
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immobile households. Population size relative toworld population (N )will be denoted
by si = Ni/N . Each household in country i has a capital endowment (ei ) and a labor
endowment (l = 1), which they supply inelastically. Hence, labor constitutes a fixed
factor in production. Capital is perfectly mobile internationally.3
2.1 Firms and capital market equilibrium
A representative firm in each country produces a single good using a stock of capital
(Ki ) and effort from labor (Ni ). There is perfect competition in the output market. In
each country, the production function F(Ki , Ni ) is homogeneous of degree one, so it
can be written in intensive form: Ni f (ki )where ki = Ki/Ni denotes the capital-labor
ratio employed in country i.F(.) is concave in its two inputs and twice continuously
differentiable. Hence: f ′(ki ) > 0, f ′′(ki ) < 0. Profit maximizing firms set the
marginal product of capital equal to its price: the tax-inclusive cost of capital. Firms
face a distortionary source-based unit-specific tax on capital (ti ).4
The first-order condition for profit maximization yields for all i
f ′i (ki ) = ti + ρ. (1)
The after-tax rate-of-return on capital (ρ) is equal across countries due to the inter-
national mobility of capital. That is, ρ is endogenously determined on the world’s
capital market such that Eq. (1) hold and the resource constraint
n∑
i=1
si ei =
n∑
i=1
si ki ≡ K
N
(2)
is satisfied, where K denotes the fixed world’s capital stock.5 An increase in the tax
rate of country i(ti ) reduces the capital stock in country i
∂ki
∂ti
= 1
f ′′i (.)
[
1 + ∂ρ
∂ti
]
< 0, (3)
3 Our results do not rely on these assumptions, but on an endogenous marginal rate of substitution between
public and private goods and a government that can only use source-based taxes on capital. See e.g. Bucov-
etsky and Wilson (1991) who show that in case households supply both capital and labor endogenously, a
similar Nash-equilibrium exists when residence-based taxes are ruled out.
4 Lockwood (2004) studies the case for an ad-valorem tax rate. Results are comparable, although tax-
competition is more intense under ad-valorem tax rates as price changes magnify the impact of taxes. This
does not affect our results though.
5 We assume (and make sure in our simulation analysis) that ρ > 0, ruling out the possibility that part of
the capital stock is not used.
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which is obtained by partially differentiating Eq. (1), holding constant t j for j = i .
Equation (3) can be signed using f ′′i (.) < 0 and the sign of the final term6
−1 < ∂ρ
∂ti
= −si
(
1/ f ′′i (.)
)
∑n
j=1 s j
(
1/ f ′′j (.)
) < 0. (4)
When all countries are small relative to the capital market, then we have ∂ρ/∂ti ≈ 0.
This case is studied in Zodrow andMieszkowski (1986) andWilson (1986). However,
ρ unambiguously decreases with ti if the number of countries is small and at least some
countries are large compared to the world’s capital market (see e.g. Wildasin 1989;
Bucovetsky 1991; Wilson 1991). An increase in ti lowers the net marginal product in
country i and causes capital to relocate towards the remaining countries. If the capital
flow is large compared to the world’s capital market, this reduces the marginal product
of capital abroad. The larger country i is relative to the world’s capital market, the
stronger its market power and the larger is this effect.
2.2 Consumers
A representative consumer features a twice-continuously differentiable,monotonously
increasing utility function of the form:Ui (gi , ci ), where gi and ci denote, respectively
public and private consumption. Household private consumption is subject to a house-
hold budget constraint, given by
ci = [ fi (.) − f ′i (.)ki ] + ρei . (5)
Hence, private consumption equals the return to labor (the wage), given by the term
in between square brackets on the right-hand side of Eq. (5), plus interest income from
the capital endowment (ρei ).
2.3 Government
The government maximizes welfare, which is determined by the utility of the rep-
resentative household, by choosing the tax rate ti . Thereby, it takes the government
budget constraint into account, which restricts public consumption to tax revenues
gi = ti ki , (6)
and the tax rates decided on by the government of other countries: t j for all j = i .
This latter assumption implies that we study Nash-equilibria. For each country, the
6 See the Appendix for a derivation.
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optimum satisfies the following condition
∂Ui/∂ti
uc,i
=
[
∂ci
∂ti
]
+ ug,i
uc,i
[
∂gi
∂ti
]
= 0, (7)
where ug,i/uc,i > 0 is short-hand notation for ug,i (ci , gi )/uc,i (ci , gi ) denoting the
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between public and private goods. The right-hand
side of Eq. (7) measures the welfare effect of the tax via, respectively, changes in
private consumption and public consumption, which are obtained by taking the partial
derivatives of (5) and (6)
∂ci
∂ti
= − f ′′i (.)
∂ki
∂ti
ki + ∂ρ
∂ti
ei < 0, (8)
∂gi
∂ti
= ki
[
1 + ti
ki
∂ki
∂ti
]
> 0. (9)
Equation (8) shows that a higher tax rate reduces private consumption for two
reasons. First, a higher tax will cause an outflow of capital. The smaller capital stock
reduces labor productivity and, therefore, the wage and private consumption. Second,
the higher tax reduces the world’s net-of-tax return on capital and, therefore, interest
income. This magnifies the reduction in private consumption.
Equation (9) shows that the effect of a higher tax on public consumption depends
on where we are on the Laffer curve. The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (9)
shows that a higher tax raises revenue over the existing tax base. The second term
indicates that a higher tax causes an erosion of the tax base to the extent that it reduces
the domestic capital stock. This reduces tax revenue, especially when the initial tax
rate is high. From Eqs. (8) and (7), it follows that a utility maximizing tax rate requires
that Eq. (9) is positive. That is, the utility maximizing tax rate is always on the upward
sloping part of the Laffer curve.
Now define ηk,i ≡ − ∂ki∂ti ≥ 0 as minus the tax coefficient of capital and ηr,i ≡
− ∂ρ
∂ti
≥ 0 as minus the tax coefficient of the interest rate. Together with Eqs. (8), (9)
and (3), we can rewrite Eq. (7) as
ug,i
uc,i
= ki + ηr,i [ei − ki ]
ki − tiηk,i ≡ MCF, (10)
reflecting the modified Samuelson rule. It shows that the marginal rate of substitution
between public and private goods on the left-hand side is equal to the marginal cost of
public funds (henceforthMCF) times themarginal rate of transformation (which equals
unity in our model). Equation (10) shows that the MCF rises in the tax coefficient of
capital ηk,i as this increases the erosion of the tax base induced by the tax. Furthermore,
the MCF in Eq. (10) increases in ηr,i if country i is a net capital exporter (ei > ki ).
It decreases if it is a net capital importer (ei < ki ). Intuitively, a net capital exporter
is a net receiver of interest vis-a-vis the rest of the world. Therefore, it suffers from
a welfare loss if the interest rate drops. This makes public goods more expensive as
higher taxes reduce the interest rate. This implies that for capital exporting countries
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we unambiguously have ug,i/uc,i = MCF > 1. This is the standard tax competition
result: the public good is undersupplied due to positive spillovers from taxation. For
a net capital importer, the lower interest rate is a net benefit because the country pays
less to foreign capital owners. This reduces the MCF. In principle, this might even
cause ug,i/uc,i = MCFi < 1, implying that the public good is oversupplied.
2.4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium is defined as a set of Nash-equilibrium tax rates (ti for all i), capital stocks
(ki for all i) and an interest rate ρ that simultaneously satisfy for each country both
the modified Samuelson rule in Eq. (10) and the demand for capital in Eq. (1), and
for all countries together the world resource constraint.7 In the Nash-equilibrium we
need that every country chooses the tax rate optimal given the tax rates decided on by
other governments. This requires that for all countries, the second-order condition for
a welfare maximum is negative
∂ug,i/uc,i
∂ti
− ∂MCFi
∂ti
< 0.
given the tax rates of the other countries.
With respect to the first term, we follow e.g. Bucovetsky (1991) and Taugourdeau
and Ziad (2011) by assuming that both gi and ci are normal goods. Together with the
tax being on the upward-sloping part of the Laffer curve [which follows from the signs
of Eqs. (7)–(9)], this implies that: ∂(ug,i/uc,i )/∂ti ≤ 0, i.e. choosing a higher tax rate
leads to a reduction in the marginal valuation of the public good.
The difficulty lies in proving that ∂MCFi/∂ti > 0. Bucovetsky (1991) shows that
this is the case for a quadratic production function, which has subsequently been used
by e.g. Bucovetsky (2009) and Devereux et al. (2008) (while Parry 2003 assumes
that ∂ki/∂ti is linear in the relevant range). This assumption ensures that the tax base
elasticity (k,i = (∂ki/∂ti )(ti/ki )) is unambiguously decreasing in the capital stock
and that the Laffer curve of country i is unambiguously shifted outwards if capital
flows in. In the next section, we will also use the quadratic production function to
avoid complications.8
7 Some papers have proven the existence of a Nash-equilibrium in models more stylized than ours, see e.g.
Laussel and Le Breton (1998) and Bayindir-Upmann and Ziad (2005), but for the model used here existence
has not yet been proven.
8 For a more general production function, Taugourdeau and Ziad (2011) show that a second-order locally
consistent equilibrium exists in case of a positive third derivative of the production function and the prescrip-
tion that the demand for capital should not be increasing in capital (∂ ln f ′i /∂ ln ki ≤ 0). These conditions
hold for a wide range of production functions commonly used in the economic literature, such as: Cobb-
Douglas; Quadratic; Logarithmic; Exponential; Logistic; and a CES production function in case the capital
share in production, and/or the substitution elasticity between capital and the fixed factor, are not too large
in the CES production. The result in Taugourdeau and Ziad (2011) does require that all capital is owned by
individuals living outside the countries considered (ei = 0).
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3 Strategic tax responses
We now explore the slope of the tax-reaction function. If the slope is positive, then
a tax increase abroad will induce a country to also increase its own tax rate and we
speak of ‘strategic complements’. If the slope is negative, then a higher tax abroad
will trigger a decrease in the country’s own tax rate as a response and we refer to this
as ‘strategic substitutes’.
In general, tax-reaction functions take the form: ti = Vi (t j , t− j ), where Vi (t j , t− j )
gives the best response of country i to the tax rates chosen by country j and all
remaining countries (where we denote the set of all countries not including countries
i and j by − j). Because there are no closed form expressions for the tax rates in
general, we linearize the tax-reaction function around an initial equilibrium. This
yields analytical expressions for the tax change by country i in response to tax changes
in (one of) the other countries. The linearized tax responses reflect optimal marginal
tax responses, evaluated at an initial equilibrium, to an assumed exogenous marginal
change in the tax rate of country j (which might represent a group of countries that
uniformly raise their tax). Hence, the analytical results derived will hold locally in
the neighborhood of the equilibrium. Section B in the online Appendix derives the
linearized tax-reaction functions by linearizing Eq. (10) around an initial equilibrium,
while assuming a CES utility function and a quadratic production function: f (k) =
b(a−k)k.9 Whenwedenote a percentage change in variable x as: ∂x/x = ∂ ln(x) = x˜ ,
the reaction function is given by
t˜i =
[(
1
1−k,i +
ηr,i−1
γi
)
− 1
σi
φi
]
′k, j(
2
1−k,i +
ηr,i−1
γi
)
k,i + 1σi
(
1 + ei tici − φik,i
) t˜ j , (11)
where σi ≡ dlog(ci/gi )/dlog(MRSi ) > 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution
between public and private goods. If σi is large, public and private goods are close
substitutes, so that the MRS is not strongly affected by changes in the ratio of private-
to-public consumption. In the limit σ → ∞ we approach a constant MRS. With
respect to the other parameters, 0 < k,i ≡ tiηk,i/ki ≤ 1 denotes the own capital
stock elasticity, ′k, j ≡ (∂ki/∂t j )(t j/ki ) = −t j/(ki f ′′i )ηr, j > 0 indicates a cross-
elasticity, γi ≡ (−∂ci/∂ti )/ki = 1 + (ei/ki − 1)ηr,i reflects the reduction in private
income following an increase in the own tax rate relative to the initial capital stock, and
finally φi ≡ [−∂log(ci/gi )/∂log(t j )]/′k, j = [1 + 2b ei−kici ki ] is proportional to the
effect of a foreign tax increase on the private-to-public goods ratio. Note that from Eq.
(10): MCFi = γi/(1 − k,i ), such that γi > 0 whenever MCFi > 0. In a symmetric
equilibrium (ei = ki ), φi = γi = 1.
The denominator on the right-hand side of Eq. (11) is positive by assumption as it
equals (minus) the second-order condition for a (local)welfaremaximum for country i .
Eq. (11) gives themarginal slope of the reaction function of country i : if the coefficient
9 Besides deriving the linearized tax-reaction functions, Section B in the online Appendix also discusses
how the slope of the reaction function changes for a CES production function. This complicates the analysis
considerably but does not invalidate our main insights.
123
10 H. Vrijburg, R. A. de Mooij
on the right-hand side of (11) is positive, then tax rates are strategic complements;
otherwise, they are strategic substitutes.Our focuswill be on the prevalence of strategic
substitutability, i.e. on cases under which the coefficient is negative. To interpret the
slope coefficient, we discuss three special cases.
3.1 Special case 1: constant MRS
First, assume a constant MRS equal to ug/uc. This is the case when the utility function
is linear (or σ → ∞). This assumption is adopted by e.g. Devereux et al. (2008), and
Bucovetsky (2009). Note that if ug/uc → ∞, welfare maximization coincides with
revenue maximization by the government, this is assumed by e.g. Kanbur and Keen
(1993). When assuming a constant MRS, Eq. (11) reads as follows (where we use
ug/uc = γi/(1 − k,i ))
t˜i =
(
ug
uc
+ ηr,i − 1
)
′k, j(
2 uguc + ηr,i − 1
)
k,i
t˜ j for i = j. (12)
We focus on the term in between brackets in the numerator. Using Eq. (10) we can
derive the following condition
ug
uc
+ ηr,i − 1 = ηr,i ei
ki
+ ug
uc
ti
ki
ηk,i > 0, (13)
for ti > 0, ki > 0 and ei > 0. This leads to the following proposition
Proposition 1 In case of a constantMRS, the tax-reaction function is always positively
sloped: tax rates are strategic complements. The slope of the reaction function is
steeper, the larger is the marginal valuation of public goods relative to private goods
(ug/uc).
See Mintz and Tulkens (1986, p. 153) who claim a similar result for revenue maxi-
mizers in their commodity tax competition model. To understand Eq. (12), note that a
higher tax in country j will cause an inflow of capital to country i, which is measured
by ′k, j > 0. This boosts both private consumption, due to a positive impact of the cap-
ital inflow on the wage rate, and public consumption as the broadening of the domestic
tax base raises public revenue if the tax rate is kept unchanged. The optimal response
in the tax rate depends on how consumers value public and private consumption. The
term ug/uc − 1 measures the extent to which the MRS between public and private
goods exceeds the marginal rate of transformation (MRT). According to the modified
Samuelson rule in Eq. (10), this occurs if the MCF exceeds unity in which case public
goods are scarcer than private goods due to distortionary taxation. Ignoring the term
ηr,i , Eq. (12) suggests that this would make it optimal for the government to raise
public goods supply. Intuitively, the exogenous inflow of capital on account of the
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higher tax rate abroad reduces the MCF, making it less costly to supply public goods
and allowing for a higher tax rate. Accordingly, tax rates are strategic complements.10
The tax response depends also on the impact of the change in ti on the interest rate,
which is measured by ηr,i . The extra inflow of capital as a result of a higher foreign
tax rate is cheaper if the interest rate that needs to be paid to foreign capital owners
is lower. As an increase in the domestic tax rate indeed reduces the interest rate by
ηr,i , this encourages country i to increase its domestic tax rate. This channel critically
depends on country size, however. Indeed, when n → ∞ or if country i is very small
relative to the rest of the world, this channel becomes irrelevant, i.e. ηr,i is close to
zero.
3.2 Special case 2: symmetric countries
The second special case is when the MRS is no longer constant, but countries are
symmetric. This implies si = 1/n, ei = ki = e,Ui (c, g) = U (c, g) for given c, g
and all i ∈ {1 : n}. Also note that, γi = φi = 1, such that ug/uc = 1/(1 − k,i ). The
marginal slope of the reaction function is now given by
t˜i =
(
ug
uc
+ ηr,i − 1 − 1σi
)
′k, j(
2 uguc + ηr,i − 1 − 1σi
)
k,i +
(
1 + gc
) 1
σi
t˜ j . (14)
As the denominator is positive by assumption, the slope of the reaction function in
Eq. (14) is determined by the sign of the numerator, which besides the term (ug/uc +
ηr,i − 1) that also features in Eq. (12) depends on the substitution elasticity between
public goods and private consumption (σ ). This leads to the following proposition
Proposition 2 With symmetric countries, the slope of the tax-reaction function will
be negative (strategic substitutes) when σi < σ¯ ≡ 1/[ug/uc − (n − 1)/n].
Proposition 2 formalizes, for a CES utility function, the remark by Mintz and
Tulkens (1986, p. 154) that ‘strategic substitutes’ follow when a sufficient degree of
inelasticity of the demand for the public good prevails’. As noted before, the higher
tax rate in country j causes an inflow of capital in country i . The broader tax base
raises public funds and yields more public goods. If public and private goods are close
substitutes (a large value for σi ), then there is little reason to reduce the tax rate in
order to replace public by private consumption. However, if public and private goods
are close complements (a small value for σi ), then the government will find it optimal
10 Undersupply of the public good (ug/uc > 1) is a feature of standard tax competition models, where
tax competition leads countries to choose inefficiently low tax rates (Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986;
Wilson 1986). The importance of ug/uc > 1 was also stressed by Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), who
argued that countries with a low valuation of public goods (ug < uc) might feature a negatively sloped
tax-reaction function, Eq. (13) shows that such a negative slope is ruled out in our model. The model of
Brueckner and Saavedra is slightly more general, leading to a modified condition: ug,i /uc,i + ηr,i − 1 =
ηr,i (ei /ki ) + (ug,i /uc,i )(ti /ki )ηk,i + (q∗/ki )(1 − ug,i /uc,i ) with q∗ denoting “land-endowment” per
capita.
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to cut the tax rate so as to boost private consumption along with public consumption.
This may cause tax rates to be strategic substitutes. Indeed, even if ug/uc > 1, we
could have a negatively sloped reaction curve if σi is sufficiently small.11
The conditions for strategic substitutability hold under plausible parameter con-
figurations. To illustrate this, assume that the MRS lies between 1.1 and 2, implying
marginal excess burdens in the range between 0.1 and 0.5. The number of countries is
varied between 3 and 100 (note that ∂σ¯ /∂n > 0 in Proposition 2). For MRS = 2 we
obtain a value for σ¯ equal to 0.75 when n = 3, whereas it increases towards 1.00 for
n = 100. For MRS = 1.1 we obtain a σ¯ of 2.31 for n = 3, while it increases to 10.00
when n is 100. Inversely, for σ = 1, strategic substitutes will occur in a symmetric
equilibrium whenever MRS < 2n−1n . This is more likely when n is larger.
12
3.3 Special case 3: marginal change in capital endowment
Equation (11) describes the marginal slope of the reaction function in the general case.
General equilibrium effects and non-linearities in MRS and MCF make it impossible
to draw unambiguous conclusions for this general case. Compared to the previous two
special cases, the terms γi and φi now appear in the marginal slope. Both parameters
depend on net capital positions: for capital exporters (ei > ki ) we have γi > 1 and
φi > 1. Yet, being a capital exporter is endogenous. A net capital export positionmight
be caused by country characteristics (fundamental parameters in the model) which
simultaneously affect the different components of the initial equilibrium in Eq. (11)
and, therefore, the prevalence of strategic substitutes. For example, bigger countries
exert more power on international capital markets such that ∂ηr,i/∂si > 0, making
strategic complementaritymore likely for them.At the same time, bigger countrieswill
set higher tax rates because they face a lower MCF (i.e. ∂MCF/∂si < 0). This makes
them more likely to be capital exporters and, as long as σ is small enough, makes
strategic substitutability more likely. Also parameters in the utility function could
simultaneously affect the ratio ug/uc and the likelihood of being a capital exporter.
As we will explain below, even if countries are symmetric except for the capital
endowment (ei ), general equilibrium effects cause ti , ki , ci and gi to differ between
countries, with conflicting implications for the likelihood of strategic substitutes.
Given these complexities, we construct a special case to identify how the parameters
γi and φi affect themarginal slope of the reaction function in Eq. (11). For this, assume
that countries are symmetric in population (s = 1/n).We study the effect of amarginal
increase in the capital endowment in one country, while leaving the total capital stock
fixed:
∑N
i=1 ∂ei = 0. When studying the implications of such a perturbation for the
reaction functions, we use the following lemma.
11 Closely related to this, Mintz and Tulkens (1986, p. 153) refer to the case where citizens demand a fixed
level of public goods (g¯). In that case, strategic substitutes always follow as an increase in the foreign tax
rate allows a lower tax rate at home to achieve the same level of public revenues.
12 Using Eq. (10) under symmetry, this condition can be made more precise by relating it to the parameters
of themodel. However, we prefer to interpret the general condition as little intuition exists for the parameters
in the stylized model and the tax rate that appears in the specific condition is endogenous.
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Lemma 1 With symmetric populations, there exists a σi ≡ σˆ for which ∂ti/∂ei = 0,
such that ∂ki/∂ei = ∂ρ/∂ei = 0 for all i ∈ N. For a quadratic production function
f (k) = b(a − k)k, and a CES utility function: σˆ ≡ ρc n.
Proof See Section C in the online Appendix. unionsq
For the tax rates to remain unchanged after a shock in ei , we require an equivalent
effect on MCFi and MRSi . From Eq. (10) we find, ∂MCFi/∂ei > 0. Hence, a larger
capital endowment makes the tax more distortive because capital exporters, being net
interest earners, experience a larger reduction in private consumption. ∂MRSi/∂ei > 0
follows from Eqs. (5), (6) and the assumption that ci and gi are normal goods. Intu-
itively, a larger capital endowment makes, ceteris paribus, citizens of country i richer,
so that private consumption increases relative to public consumption. This increases
the marginal valuation of public goods and induces the government to increase the tax.
The strength of the change in the marginal valuation of public goods is determined
by the substitution elasticity σi . Hence, there must exist a value for σi for which the
effects on MCFi and MRSi are equally strong and, hence, taxes are not affected by
a marginal change in capital endowments. Symmetry ensures that this holds for all
countries in case of a marginal change in ei (an increase for country i and a reduction
for all other countries). Given that none of the tax rates change, the equilibrium capital
allocation does not change and the net interest rate remains constant. When σ > σˆ a
higher capital endowment typically lowers the tax rate (see for example Peralta and
van Ypersele 2005; Peralta and van Ypersele 2006, who study the extreme case with
σ → ∞), while for σ < σˆ it will increase the tax rate (a case that has not yet been
studied in the literature).13
Using Lemma 1, we can define the following proposition that adheres to the final
term in Eq. (11)
Proposition 3 With symmetric populations and σi = σˆ for all i , a marginal increase
in ei unambiguously increases the likelihood that tax rates are strategic substitutes if
σˆ < σˇ ≡ − f ′′c n
(
n
n−1
)
.
Proof See Section C in the online Appendix. unionsq
Hence, when σˆ < σˇ strategic substitutes is unambiguously more prevalent for
capital exporters than for capital importers.We can numerically illustrate the condition
in Proposition 3. For instance, for n = 3, t = 0.5 and MCF = 3/2, we find σˆ = 1 <
σˇ .14
The slope of the reaction function is generally determined by the change, caused
by a foreign tax increase, in both the MCF and the MRS. Both are affected by the
net capital position. Compared to the symmetric equilibrium, capital exporters face
relatively high efficiency costs of taxation due to the effect of the tax on the country’s
own net interest income. The boost in the domestic tax base that follows a foreign
13 σˆ → n when either n or MCF increases. The range, σi ∈ {0, σˆ }, in which an increase in the endowment
of a country leads to an increase in the optimal tax ti , is therefore relatively large. This contrasts with the
cases studied in the literature.
14 For higher values of either n or MCF; σˆ → n, whereas σˇ → 0. As in such cases σˆ > σˇ , strategic
complementarity is more prevalent for capital exporters for higher values of n or MCF while σi = σˆ .
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tax increase, causes a relatively large reduction in the high MCF of a capital exporter.
With respect to the marginal valuation of public goods, recognize that an increase in
the foreign tax rate exerts a relative large decrease in private consumption of a capital
exporting country, since it suffers more from the lower interest rate. This causes a
larger reduction in the MRS for a capital exporter following a foreign tax increase.
If σ is small enough, the latter argument dominates the former and the government
wants to lower its own tax rate in response to the foreign tax increase.
4 Simulated tax-reaction functions
While linearization offers insight in the parameters determining the slope of the tax-
reaction function, it offers only insight in the local, not in the global, properties of the
tax-reaction function. This section illustrates the global properties of the tax-reaction
function for a range of tax rates. That is, we not only focus on the equilibrium but also
show the slope out of equilibrium. The simulations show that Propositions 1, 2 and 3
indeed continue to hold over this broader range of taxes, that is, the negative slope is
not a phenomenon restricted to only the equilibrium values of the tax rates.
In performing the simulations, we make a number of assumptions. Throughout the
exercises, we use a quadratic production function: f (k) = b(a − ki )ki and assume
three countries (n = 3). In the first simulation, countries are symmetric (e = k = 1)
and of equal size (s = 1/3). This gives simple expressions for public and private
consumption, aswell as for theMCF: c = b(a−1)−t; g = t andMCF = 11−t/(2b)(2/3) .
In the calibration, we set t = 1/2 and b = 1/2, implying that MCF = 3/2. We adopt
a CES utility function U = (ωc1−1/σ + (1 − ω)g1−1/σ )σ/(σ−1), whereby we set
ω = 1/2.
To satisfy themodified Samuelson rule, the symmetric equilibrium for a CES utility
function yields
(a − 2)1/σ = 3/2, (15)
where we use b = t = 1/2 and ug/uc = (a − 2)1/σ .
Figures 1 and 2 show the tax-reaction curves for country i together with the 45◦ line
(dotted). In Fig. 1 we vary σ ∈ {1,000, 5, 1, 0.2}, while simultaneously adjusting a to
keep ug/uc = 3/2 as described in Eq. (15). Wildasin (1989) and Parry (2003) study a
range of σ ∈ {0.2 : 1} and σ ∈ {0.3 : 1}, respectively, and stress that scarce empirical
evidence points to an inelastic demand for public goods (see also Rubinfeld 1987). The
point where the reaction function crosses the 45◦ line represents the Nash-equilibrium
in the case for symmetric countries. Figure 1 shows, consistent with Proposition 2,
that the slope of the tax-reaction function is increasing in σ . For σ = 1,000, we see
that the reaction function is upward-sloping. Note that in this case the marginal rate
of substitution is nearly constant, this is equivalent to assuming a linear objective
function. The result therefore is consistent with Proposition 1.15 In case σ = 1, the
15 Byvarying the value ofug/uc underlying this simulation, the slope of the reaction function forσ = 1,000
can be adjusted. Moreover, it is possible to obtain a slope of zero by choosing ug/uc = 2/3. Indeed, for
si = 1/3 we have ηr,i = 1/3 so that ug/uc + ηr,i − 1 = 0. However, under the remaining parameter
values, the equilibrium unit-specific tax rate is negative in this case.
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Fig. 1 Tax-reaction function country i for endogenous ug/uc
Fig. 2 Tax-reaction function country i under asymmetric capital positions ei = ki
tax-reaction function is downward sloping but rather flat. For lower values of σ , the
slope becomes more negative.
Figure 2 sets σ = 1 (and a = 3.5 to ensure ug/uc = 3/2), and varies the capital
endowment of country i: ei ∈ {1, 3/2, 5/2}. The larger its capital endowment, the
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larger is the capital export of the country. Because countries are asymmetric in Fig.
2, the Nash-equilibrium can no longer be found at the intersection with the 45◦ line.
The remaining parameters imply that for ei = 1, we have MCF = 3/2. Note that in
this case σˆ = 1 while σˇ = 6 when evaluated at ei = 1. Consistent with Proposition 3,
Fig. 2 shows that the slope of the tax-reaction function becomes more negative when
country 3 exports more capital.
5 Application: coalition formation in capital taxation
Tax-reaction functions are important for the analysis of tax competition. From a policy
perspective, the slope of the tax-reaction function is also critical when studying the
welfare effects of a partial tax union (see Konrad and Schjelderup 1999). This section
performs simulations of the welfare effects when a subgroup of countries forms a tax
union.16
In the simulations, we mainly use the three-country version of the model and adopt
the same calibration as in the previous section. A final set of simulations addresses the
case of more countries. In analyzing a partial tax union for n = 3, we let countries 1
and 2 coordinate (or harmonize) the tax on capital and form a tax union (henceforth: the
union countries, for which we use subscript “h”). Country 3 remains outside the union
(the outsider for which we use subscript “o”). In case we study more than 3 countries,
we let m countries coordinate their capital tax whereas n − m countries choose their
capital tax independently. For notational simplicity,we assume that thefirstm countries
coordinate their taxes, whereas country m + 1 till n are outsiders. The union countries
are assumed symmetric throughout the analysis, where s ≡ s1 = s2 = ... = sm
denotes their share in the world population. The union countries choose a joint tax
rate th that maximizes the sum of welfare in the m union countries:
∑m
i=1 sUi (.) =
msUh(.), given the tax rate chosen by the outsider(s).17 The outsider countries are
assumed to be symmetric as well, where so ≡ (1 − ms)/(n − m). Governments of
outsider countries each choose their own to to maximize the welfare of their citizens,
given the tax rates of both the union countries and the other outsider countries (if any).
We allow the outsider countries to be either smaller or larger than the union countries
in terms of population. Furthermore, we allow the outsider countries to have a larger
capital endowment in order to illustrate Proposition 3. Finally, in the last case studied,
we choose country size and capital holdings for the insiders such that the formation
of a union resembles roughly EU capital tax coordination. Preferences are the same
in all countries.
16 The welfare effects of tax unions are related to the literature on coalition formation. See e.g. Burbidge
et al. (1997) who study the endogenous formation of coalitions. The authors find that cooperation between
all countries is only feasible when countries are sufficiently similar such that their policy preferences are
aligned. Otherwise, smaller coalitions will be formed consisting of countries with relatively similar policy
preferences. This finding is confirmed by Sørensen (1996). See De Mooij and Vrijburg (2010) and the
references therein for future discussion.
17 Assuming symmetry between the union countries implies that we side-step the complications that arise in
case of a union between asymmetric countries. When union members are asymmetric, both their preference
for the optimal union policy and the payoff from cooperation might differ. Our approach is similar to that
used in the literature on coalitions, see for example Kennan and Riezman (1990).
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In exploring the impact of a tax union on tax rates and welfare, we compare the
decentralized equilibrium (indicated by superscript “D”), where all three countries
choose their tax rate independently in a Nash-setting, with the equilibrium where
some countries have formed a tax union (indicated by superscript “H”).
5.1 Predictions
We first explore comparative statics to understand how a tax union affects tax rates. For
the union countries, the parameters ηDk,h and η
D
r,h change through the formation of a tax
union. Thiswill affect the optimal choices regarding tax rates and, therefore, outcomes.
For outsider countries, there is no direct impact of a tax union. Indeed, the parameters
ηDk,o and η
D
r,o do not change due to the formation of a tax union. The outsider countries
are, however, affected indirectly through a change in tax policy in the union countries
to the extent that this modifies the allocation of capital ko and the interest rate ρ.
Section D in the online Appendix derives the tax coefficients under a tax union
and finds that ηHk,h < η
D
k,h : the joint policy response by the union countries elimi-
nates spillovers upon each other. Accordingly, when evaluated at the decentralized
equilibrium values of ti and ki , the formation of a tax union will generally reduce the
MCF. This gives the union countries an incentive to raise their tax rate. Furthermore,
Section D in the online Appendix also shows that ηHr,h = mηDr,h . As the union countries
together are m times the size of a single country, the interest rate response to the tax is
m times as large. This larger tax coefficient of the interest rate further reduces theMCF
if the union countries are net capital importers. However, a larger interest coefficient
mitigates the reduction in the MCF when union countries are net capital exporters,
and could in principle even dominate the reduction in ηk,h .
FollowingKonrad and Schjelderup (1999, p. 161), we derive themarginal change in
welfare for the union countries in response to a marginal increase in the joint tax rate18
∂Uh
∂th
1
uc,h
∣∣∣∣
th=t D1
=
[
(kh − eh) + (ug,h/uc,h)th
2b
] [
(m − 1)s + (1 − ms) ∂to
∂th
]
(16)
where we use: ηr,i = si (under a quadratic production function). The first term in
square brackets is unambiguously positive if the union countries are capital importers
(kh > eh). The higher tax raiseswelfare, both due to an increase in public consumption
and due to the reduction in the interest rate. If the union countries are net capital
exporters, however, the latter effect is negative as the higher tax lowers net interest
income received from abroad.
The term in the second square brackets in Eq. (16) captures, following Beaudry et
al. (2000), spillovers within the tax union [first term: (m −1)s] and spillovers between
the tax union and the outsider(s) [second term: (1 − ms)∂to/∂th]. The slope of the
tax-reaction function determines the sign of the latter term, implying that the whole
18 Note, this term only includes the impact from a change in the tax rate of other union countries and
outsiders. The marginal increase in the own tax rate has no impact on welfare at the margin when the initial
tax rate maximizes decentralized welfare.
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term in the second square brackets is always positive under strategic complementarity
as the outside country will adopt a tax response of the same sign as that chosen by
the union countries. This is the case in Konrad and Schjelderup (1999). However, the
term may become negative under strategic substitutability, in which case a welfare
loss from the formation of a tax union might occur: ‘partial cooperation is likely to
worsen welfare when spillovers within and between coalitions differ in sign and when
the aggregate effects of spillovers between coalitions more than offset the positive
effects from internalizing spillovers within groups (Beaudry et al. 2000, p. 10)’. Our
model extends the analyses by Beaudry et al. (2000) and Konrad and Schjelderup
(1999). Spillovers in Beaudry et al. are defined in a model where symmetric coalitions
choose policies simultaneously, causing strategic actions (in our terminology) to be
characterized by: dth/dto = 1 when comparing the equilibrium tax policies before
and after coalition formation (where we interpret the outsiders as another coalition for
simplicity). Equation (16) shows that in such a hypothetical symmetric equilibrium
our model will show positive spillovers within and between coalitions, ruling out
welfare losses. However, in our paper outsiders do not form a coalition, such that the
change in tax policy abroad only reflects a response to the creation of a tax union,
whereas in Beaudry et al. dth/dto = 1 reflects symmetric internalized spillovers
only. Although the spillovers within the tax union are unambiguously positive in
our model, this asymmetry in coalition formation might cause the net-of-strategic-
response-spillovers between the union and the outsider(s) to be negative. In general
this occurs when: ∂to/∂th < −(m − 1)s/(1 − ms).19
The change in welfare in an outsider country is given by
∂Uo
∂th
1
uc,o
∣∣∣∣
to=t Do
=
[
(ko − eo) + (ug,o/uc,o)to
2b
]
ms.
Welfare in outsider countries rises if the tax union increases its tax rate, as it benefits
from an inflow of capital. Only when the outsider countries are large capital exporters,
may a reduction in net interest income imply that welfare decreases.
5.2 Simulations
Table 1 presents simulation results of the formation of tax unions under alternative
parameter values. The calibration follows Sect. 4, whereby the first five columns in
the table indicate how the parameters are varied. In particular, for the n = 3 case
we consider several combinations using two values for the MRS (3/2 and 3, the
latter implying a low σ¯ ), two values for σ(1 and 0.2), and three values for the size of
the countries that form a tax union (s = 2/5, 1/3 and 1/6). Furthermore, we allow
country 3 to have a relatively large capital endowment in half of the simulations:
19 In case of 3 symmetric countries of which 2 form a tax union (m = 2), we need ∂t0/∂th < −1 for
union countries to experience a welfare loss from marginally increasing their tax rate. We exclude this case
by assuming that ‘ ... the derivatives of the reaction functions [are] less than 1 in absolute value over the
relevant range ... [which] is sufficient for uniqueness [Tirole (1988), p. 226]’. See Wilson (1991, p.436) for
the same assumption.
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e3 = 1/(1 − 2s) − 2s/(1 − 2s)eh , affecting its capital exports. We then increase
the number of countries from 3 to 12 and 210 (close to the number of countries in
the world), while varying the relative size of the union (between 1/3 and 2/3 of all
countries). This illustrates that strategic substitutes can also occur for n larger than
3. For the latter simulations, we choose a value of 2 for the MRS, to ensure that
the interest rate remains positive. The final row is calibrated such as to approach tax
coordination within the EU, while recognizing that the model is too stylized to draw
firm conclusions. For this, we used OECD-data showing that the EU inhabits currently
close to 7% of the world’s population and earns 25% of the world’s income, which
we interpret as approximately a 25% capital endowment (most likely underestimating
the true figure), making the EU a large capital exporter.
Columns (6) and (7) show the decentralized equilibrium tax rates. The symmetric
equilibrium is calibrated at t = 0.5. We see that larger countries set higher tax rates,
as in Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991). Furthermore, as discussed in Sect. 3, a
larger capital endowment has an ambiguous effect on the equilibrium tax rate. The
simulations show that whenMCF = 3, the country with the larger capital endowment,
country 3, chooses a higher tax rate compared to the country with the smaller capital
endowment. These results are in line with Sect. 3, where for MCF = 3 we find σˆ >
1 ≥ σ : the increase in the MRS dominates the increase in the MCF that follows from
a larger capital endowment. Hence, equilibrium taxes for the capital abundant country
are expected to increase. For MCF = 3/2, equilibrium taxes are rather insensitive to
changes in the capital endowment.
Column (8) shows the percentage change in the equilibrium tax rates by countries
that form a tax union. We see that, except for the last row, the union countries always
increase their tax rates (t Hh > t
D
h ) after forming a tax union. The tax increase by the
union countries is increasing in their size. Intuitively, spillovers between two larger
countries are large, relative to spillovers vis-a-vis a small third country. When union
countries import capital (eh < 1), the tax increase is also generally larger, since the
resulting lower interest rate benefits net capital importers at the expense of capital
exporters. Furthermore, we see that when the union becomes a small fraction of the
total number of countries (from 2/3 to 1/3), the increase in the tax by the union
countries is reduced because the internalized spillovers are relatively smaller. The
reduction in the equilibrium tax rate after the formation of a union in the last row can
be explained by pointing out that the EU is a large capital exporter, hence, lower taxes
raise net interest income in the EU.
Column (9) shows that the response by the non-union country varies, reflecting
either strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability. In fact, outsider coun-
tries reduce their tax rate in most cases reported in Table 1 consistent with strategic
substitutability. Hence, strategic substitutability might be a reasonable case in tax
competition models when governments maximize welfare. If union countries increase
their tax rate by more, we see that also the change by the outsider countries gets larger.
The opposite holds if the union becomes a smaller fraction of the total number of
countries.
The last two columns present the welfare effects measured by the compensating
variation (CV ) as a percentage of total production of a country: f (ki ) = (a − bki )ki .
The CVi represents the increase in private consumption that is required under the tax
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Table 1 Simulation results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
ug
uc
σ s eh n (m) t
D
h t
D
o 
th/th (%) 
to/to (%) CVh (%) CVo (%)
3/2 1 2/5 1 3 (2) 0.51 0.48 14.59 −0.45 −0.75 −3.63
3/2 1 2/5 3/4 3 (2) 0.52 0.50 22.71 −4.53 −1.15 0.23
3/2 1 1/3 1 3 (2) 0.50 0.50 12.25 −0.30 −0.52 −2.43
3/2 1 1/3 3/4 3 (2) 0.50 0.50 18.31 −1.84 −0.78 −1.77
3/2 1 1/6 1 3 (2) 0.47 0.56 6.13 −0.06 −0.13 −0.53
3/2 1 1/6 3/4 3 (2) 0.46 0.55 8.40 −0.18 −0.19 −0.63
3/2 1/5 2/5 1 3 (2) 0.50 0.49 2.73 −0.51 −0.14 −0.83
3/2 1/5 2/5 3/4 3 (2) 0.50 0.50 4.44 −2.38 −0.15 0.02
3/2 1/5 1/3 1 3 (2) 0.50 0.50 2.48 −0.39 −0.09 −0.58
3/2 1/5 1/3 3/4 3 (2) 0.50 0.50 3.84 −1.15 −0.10 −0.45
3/2 1/5 1/6 1 3 (2) 0.49 0.51 1.52 −0.11 −0.02 −0.15
3/2 1/5 1/6 3/4 3 (2) 0.49 0.51 2.10 −0.19 −0.02 −0.18
3 1 2/5 1 3 (2) 0.53 0.46 50.75 8.94 −6.76 −22.30
3 1 2/5 3/4 3 (2) 0.51 0.50 56.31 13.50 −6.45 −33.02
3 1 1/3 1 3 (2) 0.50 0.50 35.98 6.41 −4.94 −15.01
3 1 1/3 3/4 3 (2) 0.48 0.52 39.40 8.12 −4.66 −20.14
3 1 1/6 1 3 (2) 0.47 0.67 12.19 1.05 −0.99 −3.08
3 1 1/6 3/4 3 (2) 0.45 0.67 13.39 1.14 −0.96 −3.53
3 1/5 2/5 1 3 (2) 0.51 0.48 8.72 −1.50 −1.18 −7.02
3 1/5 2/5 3/4 3 (2) 0.47 0.54 9.15 2.18 −1.32 −28.01
3 1/5 1/3 1 3 (2) 0.50 0.50 8.76 −1.72 −0.82 −5.69
3 1/5 1/3 3/4 3 (2) 0.46 0.56 8.36 −0.44 −0.75 −12.24
3 1/5 1/6 1 3 (2) 0.47 0.55 5.10 −0.73 0.14 −1.25
3 1/5 1/6 3/4 3 (2) 0.43 0.57 4.46 −0.66 0.15 −1.21
2 1/5 1/12 1 12 (8) 0.50 0.50 5.43 −0.37 −0.33 −1.44
2 1/5 1/12 1 12 (4) 0.50 0.50 10.09 −1.48 −1.46 −4.80
2 1/5 1/210 1 210 (140) 0.50 0.50 5.84 −0.84 −0.58 −1.59
2 1/5 1/210 1 210 (30) 0.50 0.50 1.57 −0.04 −0.03 −0.09
2 1/5 7/100 1/30 3.6 210 (30) 0.60 0.49 −0.56 0.01 −0.01 0.02
For all simulations, we choose ω = 1/2. The parameter b in the production function f = b(a − k)k, is
calibrated on the symmetric equilibrium, using t = 1/2, such that b follows from the choice of ug/uc =
MCF. a follows from the choice of σ such that the MRS equals the desired value of ug/uc . See Sect. 4
for a discussion. With respect to σˇ we find in case of the 3-country simulations: (i) for MCF = 3/2 and
σ = 1, σˇ > 5.75; (ii) for MCF = 3/2 and σ = 0.2; (iii) σˇ > 8; (iv) for MCF = 3 and σ = 1, σˇ > 1.4; (v)
and for MCF = 3 and σ = 0.2, σˇ > 3.4. For n = 12, σˇ > 14 and for n = 210, σˇ > 300
union equilibrium to make the citizens of country i equally well off as compared to the
decentralized equilibrium. A negative value therefore indicates a welfare gain from
the formation of a tax union; a positive value reflects a welfare loss. We see that in
most cases both countries gain from the formation of a tax union. This gain is bigger
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when large countries form a tax union and when tax rates are strategic complements.
The outsider country only loses from the tax union when it is a capital exporter. The
union countries suffer a welfare loss when (i) the union countries are small compared
to the non-union country; and (ii) the outsider country responds to the tax increase by
the union countries by reducing its own tax rate.20 In the calibration for the EU, we
see a small welfare gain for the EU countries upon forming a tax union and a small
welfare loss for the remaining countries.
The above results imply the following lessons for the literature on tax coordination.
First, we extend Beaudry et al. (2000) by showing that the welfare effects of partial
tax unions should be judged inclusive of strategic responses between the tax union
and outsiders. Our model features positive spillovers within the tax union and between
the tax union and outsiders when evaluated exclusive of strategic responses. Yet, we
show that strategic substitutability can turn the sign of the latter spillover, which might
dominate the welfare effect of a partial tax union. This implies that if the EU is seen as
a relatively closed economy, studies on tax coordination among a subset of EU mem-
ber states should incorporate strategic effects which might reduce the welfare gains.
Indeed, Brøchner et al. (2007) and Bettendorf et al. (2010) may overestimate the wel-
fare gains from a tax union. In contrast,Sørensen (2004a) does allow for strategic
responses. Second, papers that study tax coordination amongst all EU member states
often ignore strategic reactions upon the creation of such a tax union (see e.g. Betten-
dorf et al. 2006; Sørensen 2004b; Brøchner et al. 2007). Our simulations suggest that
relaxing this assumptionmight not affect the key results of these papersmuch. Both the
large number of countries outside the EU and the endogenous marginal valuation of
public goods (causing relative flat reaction functions) cause small strategic responses
in that case. Furthermore, these papers often assume that the EU member states will
coordinate upon an effective tax rate close to the current EU average. This may be
close to the upper-bound of the range of reasonable long-run coordinated equilibrium
tax rates for the EU, given that the EU is a large capital exporter.
6 Conclusion
This paper analytically derives the conditions for tax rates to be strategic substitutes
in an asymmetric tax-competition model. These conditions appear to be rather mild as
long as governments maximize welfare and utility is generally specified. Specifically,
under reasonable parameter values a substitution elasticity between public and private
goods below unity is sufficient to cause tax rates to be strategic substitutes in the
standard tax competitionmodel with symmetric countries.With asymmetric countries,
a downward sloping tax-reaction function is more likely to occur for capital exporters.
The existence of strategic substitutes has important implications for the welfare
effects of tax unions. For instance, earlier papers either explicitly or implicity assumed
that tax rates are strategic complements and found that the formation of tax unions is
20 A welfare loss for the countries that form a tax union can be avoided when assuming a Stackelberg-
leader game, where the union countries act as the Stackelberg leader. In this case, strategic substitutes still
leads to a welfare loss, but now all is on account of outsider countries, as the union countries foresee the
“aggressive” response by the outsiders (see De Mooij and Vrijburg 2010 for a discussion).
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unambiguously welfare improving for the participating countries. In the presence of
strategic substitutes, however, we show that the formation of a tax unionmight actually
reducewelfare for the union countries since the adverse response in the outside country
may offset the benefits of forming the union.
Our paper leaves room for several extensions. First, one may want to allow for a
more general class of government objectives, including the Leviathan government, as
in Edwards and Keen (1996). Second, endogenous coalition formation along the lines
of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010) may shed new light on strategic tax interactions.
Which tax unions will be formed, and how this is related to the existence of strategic
substitutes is left for future research.
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Appendix: Deriving tax coefficients
This appendix derives the tax coefficients ηk,i and ηr,i defined in Eqs. (3) and (4) in
Sect. 2.1.
Decentralization
Under decentralization, we first differentiate Eq. (1) to show how a change in the tax
rate in country i affects the capital stock in countries i and j
∂ki
∂ti
= 1
f ′′i (.)
[
1 + ∂ρ
∂ti
]
, (17)
∂k j
∂ti
= 1
f ′′j (.)
[
∂ρ
∂ti
]
for j = i. (18)
From Eq. (2) it follows that the total size of the capital stock is fixed, therefore
si
∂ki
∂ti
= −
n∑
j=1, j =i
s j
∂k j
∂ti
. (19)
Combining Eqs. (17)–(19) we obtain
0 >
∂ρ
∂ti
= −si/ f
′′
i (.)∑n
j=1 s j/ f ′′j (.)
≡ −ηDr,i > −1, (20)
filling this in Eq. (17) gives
∂ki
∂ti
= 1
f ′′i (.)
⎧
⎨
⎩
∑n
j=1, j =i
[
s j/ f ′′j (.)
]
∑n
j=1
[
s j/ f ′′j (.)
]
⎫
⎬
⎭ ≡ −η
D
k,i < 0. (21)
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